Abstract: In this paper, I motivate a cut free sequent calculus for classical logic with first order quantification, allowing for singular terms free of existential import. Along the way, I motivate a criterion for rules designed to answer Prior's question about what distinguishes rules for logical concepts, like 'conjunction' from apparently similar rules for putative concepts like 'tonk', and I show that the rules for the quantifiers-and the existence predicate-satisfy that condition.
sequents and defining rules
Let's take it for granted for the moment that learning a language involves-at least in part-learning how assertions and denials expressed in that language bear on one another. The basic connection, of course, is that to assert A and to deny A clash. When we learn conjunction, we learn that there is a clash involved in asserting A, asserting B and denying A ∧ B. Similarly, when we learn disjunction, we learn that there is a clash involved in asserting A ∨ B, denying A and denying B.
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element of ∆. The structural rules of the sequent calculus can be understood in the following way [9] . Identity- I will not defend these rules here (I have done so elsewhere [9] ), except by showing how they may be used to shed light on the behaviour of rules as definitions of logical concepts, and in particular the scope for rules concerning quantification and existence.
So, let's suppose we have a language L governed by some relation L satisfying the constrains of Identity, Weakening, Contraction and Cut. How might we extend the language with a new concept? One way to characterise this task is to characterise the new language L ′ (extending L) with a new relation L ′ extending L . Suppose, for example, we have a language consisting of some atomic vocabulary, together with the one place operator ¬ satisfying the usual classical principles. Suppose we wish to extend the language with a binary connective for conjunction. One way to do this is to impose a Left and a Right rule for conjunction from the sequent calculus, something like this pair of rules-
Γ, A, B ∆ [∧L]
Γ, A ∧ B ∆ Γ A, ∆ Γ B, ∆ [∧R] Γ A ∧ B, ∆ -and this would certainly have the desired effect. However, it seems hard to motivate such an addition, or to explain how these rules succeed in introducing a concept while a superficially similar pair of rules for a connective like 'tonk' [8] -Γ, B ∆ [tonkL] Γ, A tonk B ∆ Γ A, ∆ [tonkR] Γ A tonk B, ∆ -do not seem to do quite the same kind of job. Imposing an arbitrary pair of Left and Right rules is too strong for the successful addition of a new concept, not because it leads to Bad Things (like tonk) but because it makes claims on L ′ that the relation may not be able to meet. Under the assmumptions concerning norms governing assertion and denial we have set out, the rule [tonkL] makes a claim concerning assertions of tonk-statements, while the rule [tonkR] makes a claim concerning denials of tonk-statements. An assertion of A tonk B involves a clash when an assertion of B involves a clash. Similarly, a denial of A tonk B involves a clash when an denial of A involves a clash. The only way that could work, in the presence of Cut, Identity and Weakening is when all positions clash. If the original relation L was non-trivial, then the new language L ′ with its relation L ′ is a revisionary extension of L, not only adding claims about clashes involving the new vocabulary, but revising our view of what clashes there might be in L. It is not so much an extension to L as a revision of it.
How did this take place? The rules of Cut and Identity already connect norms governing assertions and norms governing denials. The rules [tonkL] and [tonkR] say too much, in making independent and ill-fitting impositions on assertion and on denial. They are ill-suited to be understood as instructions to extend the relation L on the language L to a relation L ′ on language L ′ satisfying Cut and Identity.
On the other hand, in another sense a pair of Left and Right rules may say too little, since they need not specify precisely when assertions (or denials) of tonk statements involve a clash. As rules that may not be invertible, they just require that under conditions there is a clash-they leave open the possibility that there may be clashes under other conditions too. Consider this pair of rules for the putative connective tink:
Γ A tink B, ∆ These rules tell us that an assertion of A tink B clashes where an assertion of A and an assertion of B would have clashed, and a denial of A tink B clashes where the denial of A and the denial of B would have clashed. These conditions are satisfied if A tink B is identified with A ∧ B, or with A ∨ B, or with any of the multitude of other propositions entailed by A ∧ B and entailing A ∨ B. These rules do too little to characterise a connective.
The Left and Right rules of a sequent calculus can, under certain circumstances, be neither too heavy (like the rules for tonk) nor too light (like the rules for tink) to pick out a single concept. Nuel Belnap characterised the situation by distinguishing those rules that are not too heavy (they provide a conservative extension to the source language L) nor too light (they are uniquely defining over that language L) [3] . In the rest of this section I will offer an explanation of how such rules can arise out of a more fundamental criterion, the defining rule. Here is an exam-ple, a defining rule for conjunction:
This differs from a pair of Left and Right rules in two ways. In this case, it characterises the behaviour of conjunction formulas on one side (in this case, the left side) of the sequent alone, and second, it is an invertible rule, to be read from top-tobottom and also from bottom-to-top. (This is the function of the double horizontal line.) Understood in terms of assertion and denial, it states that an assertion of a conjunction A ∧ B involves a clash (with the assertions Γ and denials ∆) if and only if the assertions of A and B (with Γ and ∆) also involves a clash.
The [∧Df] rule completely characterises clashes involving assertions of conjunctions (alongside the rest of the vocabulary) in terms of clashes involving their components. By itself, it says nothing concerning denials of conjunctions. However, the denials are not left out-the characterisation of denials of conjunctions is achieved by way of the rules of Identity and Cut in the extended language. If we have some language L with clashes characterised in that vocabulary by the relation L , satisfying Identity and Cut (and perhaps some other rules allowing for composition of arbitrary formulas) then we can consider adding [∧Df] to characterise conjunction, in a new language L + ∧ with a new consequence relation L+∧ , constrained to still satisfy Identity and Cut. In the extended language we have, by Identity [Id] A ∧ B A ∧ B (since the assertion of A ∧ B clashes with its denial), and we can then apply [∧Df] to this identity sequent to infer something concerning denials of conjunctions: [Id] A ∧ B A ∧ B [∧Df ] A, B A ∧ B
We learn that a denial of a conjunction clashes with the assertion of the conjuncts. This goes some way to characterising denials of conjuncts, but we would like to know more-in particular, we would like to know whether the denial of a conjunction clashes in other contexts. Here, we can use the Cut rule.
A, B A ∧ B Defining rules can be given for disjunction, the material conditional and negation in the same way:
In each case, the top-to-bottom reading of the defining rule provides one of the traditional sequent calculus Left/Right rules, and the other can be recovered using Identity (on a primitive sequent involving the introduced concept alone), a Defining Rule to unwrap the connective on the side on which it is defined, and Cuts to make the context general. Here is the case for disjunction:
This gives us the usual rule:
Here is the case for the conditional:
This gives us the usual rule
And finally, for negation: [Id] ¬A ¬A [¬Df ] A, ¬A Γ, A ∆ 
then we have defined A tonk B to be equivalent to A, and [tonkL] is not satisfied by the connective. There is no way to introduce something satisfying both tonk rules by a defining rule of this kind. 1 So, defining rules give us an independently motivated answer to Prior's original question concerning when inference rules successfully introduce a new concept. Defining rules introduce a concept to a language, characterising the norms governing assertions (or denials) featuring that concept. In the next section, we will consider how we can extend the work of defining rules to consider quantifiers.
generality and classical quantifiers
Conjunction, disjunction, negation and the material conditional are propositional connectives that rely on no assumptions about the internal structure of sentences. Quantifiers are different. For quantifiers, we need our sentences to have some internal structure-in particular, for first order quantifiers, we need to identify a class of singular terms, so we can articulate the connections between claims like these:
So, let's suppose that our language has a designated class of singular terms (we'll use m, n, . . . , s, t, . . . for singular terms of various kinds 2 ), and a class of variables (we'll use x, y, z, . . . for variables) for the quantifiers (∀x), (∀y), . . . and (∃x), (∃y), . . . In general, if a language allows for sentences to include variables unbound by any quantifier, then the variables will be among the class of singular terms. We will not make that assumption here, and for clarity, we will take it that all variables occuring in sentences must be bound by quantifiers, though nothing important hangs on this.
For each sentence A in our language, we may single out some instances of a singular term occuring in A by enclosing that term parentheses. A(n) is a sentence with some number of instances of n singled out. 3 Given A(n), the formula (∀x)A(x) is found by replacing those designated instances of n by the variable x and binding the formula with the quantifier (∀x). So, for example, if A(n) is the formula
with the designated instances of n indicated by underlining, then the corresponding formula (∃x)A(n) is
This means that we can replace some number instances of a singular term in a formula by variables, and bind them with a quantifier in order to construct a new formula. 4 This leads to the natural question; What is the connection between A(n) and (∀x)A(x)? Or between A(n) and (∃x)A(x)? The classical behaviour of the quantifiers suggests the following pair of defining rules:
(where n is not present in the bottom sequent of both rules). These rules are satisfied by the quantifiers in classical first order predicate logic. (∀x)A(x) is false in a model if and only if we can assign a value for n, for which A(n) is false in that model (provided that n is free to interpret however we wish). On the other hand (∃x)A(x) is true in a model if and only if we can assign a value for n such that A(n) is true in that model. These rules can be motivated in terms of assertion and denial, too. Denying (∀x)A(x) (in the context of asserting Γ and denying ∆) involves a clash if and only if denying A(n) would involve a clash, where n is a name free of any commitments. Asserting (∃x)A(x) (in the context of asserting Γ and denying ∆) involves a clash if and only if asserting A(n) would involve a clash, where n is a new name.
For these rules to work in the intended way, the name n has to be appropriate. Not every singular term in every language can do the job. Here is an example. Consider RA the finite set of axioms of Robinson's Arithmetic. 5 In the context of classical predicate logic, we can derive RA 0 ̸ = 3088. There is a clash involved in asserting the axioms of RA and in denying that 0 is unequal to 3088. However, the term 3088 does not appear in the axioms of RA. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to generalise using [∀Df] to deduce PA (∀x)(0 ̸ = x). Although 3088
does not appear in the axioms of RA, it is not logically independent of them. In the syntax of RA, 3088 is a function term, 6 which means that it is not free to be interpreted arbitrarily, given the commitments made in the other assertions and denials we have made-in this case, in RA.
In general, in a given language L with a consequence relation , we will say that a term α in a category A is deductively general iff for each sequent Γ ∆ that can be derived, so can Γ [α := β] ∆[α := β] where α is globally replaced in that sequent by another term β in the category A. 7 In first order classical predicate logic, function terms are not deductively general singular terms, but primitive names are. If we consider the conseqence relation of Peano Arithmetic, defined by setting Γ PA ∆ iff PA, Γ ∆ over the language of predicate logic with 0, successor, addition, multiplication and identity, where PA is an axiomatisation of PA, then the constant term 0 is not deductively general, since we have (∃x)(0 ̸ = x ′ ) PA (it's inconsistent with the axioms of PA for 0 be the successor of some number), but we do not have (∃x)(
Our proposed defining rules [∀Df] and [∃Df] make sense only when we impose the restriction that the terms n appearing in the defining rule are deductively general. However, there is a tension between this condition and the form of the defining rules themselves. Consider a toy example, in which we have a language with a primitive predicate F, a stock of names n, m,…, and a single one-place function symbol g, and it is interpreted in the usual classical fashion. In this language, n and m are names, while g(n), g(m), g(g(n)), etc., are terms but not names. How can we derive (∀x)Fx Fg(n) when we extend the language using [∀Df]? We can certainly derive (∀x)Fx Fn for each name n, as follows: [Id] (∀x)Fx (∀x)Fx [∀Df ] (∀x)Fx Fn However, there is no way to apply the rule [∀Df] to generate the conclusion Fg(n), since g(n) is not a name-it is not deductively general. If we were to require that in the extended language, the names remained deductively general, we would require that the consequence relation satisfy the condition of Specification:
which permits a gobal replacement of the deductively general term n by the term t of the same category, which may be less general. 8 In other words, the specification 6 Literally, it is the term '0' with the successor function applied to it 3088 times. 7 In the rest of this paper, the only syntactic category we will consider is the category of singular terms. However, in other contexts, we will consider other syntactic categories, such as the category of predicates, and the category of sentences. 8 The first paper in which a rule of this form is explicitly considered in a Gentzen system is Arnon Avron's 1993 paper "Gentzen-type systems, resolution and tableaux" [2] . rule ensures that the terms n indeed are deductively general. If we could appeal to the specification rule in a derivation, we could conclude (∀x)Fx Fg(n) in the following way: [Id] (∀x)Fx (∀x)Fx
Specification differs from the other sequent rules we have seen. It is not a local rule in a derivation introducing a single formula, but a global rule modifying the entire sequent. 9 In the classical sequent calculus it is an admissible rule, rather than a primitive rule, because any step in the derivation in which ends in a sequent involving a general term could be converted into a step in which that term is replaced by a more specific one. 
Notice that the resulting derived rule
no longer requires the side condition to the effect that n is absent from Γ or ∆. The Γ and ∆ in this derivation are arbitrary, and do not pass through the inference step [∀Df], where the side condition is in force. However, this algorithm does not give us the more general rule of the form
where t is an arbitrary singular term (not necessarily a deductively general one).
To justify this form of the [∀L] rule we must apply the algorithm not to an application of [∀Df] to an identity sequent (∀x)A(x) (∀x)A(x), but to the result of specifying the result: 
So, when we keep in mind the difference between deductively general terms and terms with more restricted behaviour (such as function terms), we can see that the standard Left and Right rules for the quantifiers can be understood in terms of their defining rules. In particular, the defining rule for a quantifier depends on the presence of deductively general terms, and the behaviour of these general terms-and their interaction with Identity, Cut and Specification generates the special asymmetric behaviour of these rules. One rule (the right rule for the universal quantifier; the left rule for the existential quantifier) invokes side conditions. The other rule does not.
quantifiers and non-denoting terms
However, there are reasons why we might want to reject these classical quantification rules. In particular, we may want to assert (∀x)Fx while denying Ft for some terms t in the language. For example, you might take it that according to the theory of real numbers we have (∀x)(x < 0 ∨ x = 0 ∨ x > 0)-everything can be compared with 0-without concluding that (
is comparable with 0-rather, this seems like something to be denied. One way to avoid concluding (
" from the language. Perhaps we might banish the term on the grounds that, according to the theory of real numbers, division is not a total function. There is no such number as
However, this is not, as a matter of fact, how everyday mathematical discourse regiments the language. The freedom of allowing singular terms such as x y and lim x→∞ f(x) which may occasionally fail to take values is a flexibility that is very useful for mathematical practice. It would be needlessly complicated to banish all such terms from our vocabulary. Rather, it seems that we may allow undefined terms in the vocabulary, provided that we are careful about the behaviour of those terms.
There are many ways to admit non-denoting terms to the vocabulary without doing too much violence to the norms of classical logic. One such attempt that is very congenial to the proof-theoretical framework we're exploring is due to Solomon Feferman, in his paper "Definedness" [5] . In that paper, Feferman provides a straightforward Hilbert-style proof system and Tarskian semantics for a logic which minimally modifies classical first order predicate logic by allowing for undefined singular terms. In the rest of this paper, I will show how considerations concerning generality and defining rules can independently motivate that logic.
If we are to admit undefined terms to the vocabulary, we need to be careful with regard to our rules for the quantifiers. No longer is the rule [∀Df] appropriate if the name n is allowed to be undefined-or rather, if n is deductively general, and an undefined term can be found in the same category as n. For otherwise, we could derive
and then, specify to the undefined term 1 0 . So, something has to give, if we are to accept (∀x)(x < 0 ∨ x = 0 ∨ x > 0) and reject (
One option would be to deny that 1 0 is in the same syntactic category as the deductively general term n. The name n is general, but it is not so general as to encompass the behaviour of non-denoting singular terms. This seems against the spirit of the enterprise, where we allow terms to be undefined, and where it is a matter of the theory (or the different views of the participants in a dialogue) as to whether terms are defined or not. That seems to be a matter of semantics, and not of syntactic category alone. We would very much like to allow the use of logical techniques in a discussion where we have participants who disagree not only about what is the case, but also disagree about what there is-in a shared vocabulary with an agreed upon syntactic regimentation. 10 So, if we allow for assertion and denial of sentences, a natural generalisation is to allow for sequents to register pro and con attitudes toward terms, too. The guiding idea is that to rule a term in is allow it as an appropriate term to substitute into a quantifier, or to take it to denote. To rule a term out is to keep it in the vocabulary (mathematicians do not reject 1 0 as syntactically ill-formed) but to not take it as a suitable substitution for generalisations. To make room for this, our sequents will not feature sentences alone on the left and the right, but also terms. A sequent is now a pair Γ ∆ where each of Γ and ∆ can contain terms as well as sentences.
How are we to reflect this change in the rules for quantifiers? The natural change to the defining rules for the universal and existential quantifier is to re-quire in the premises the condition that the term n is defined.
The upshot of denying (∀x)A(x) is to be prepared to deny A(n) for a some new name which you rule in. To assert (∃x)A(x) is to be prepared to grant A(n) for a new name n, which you rule in.
When we apply the algorithm to use Identity, Cut and Specification to generate the remaining Left/Right rule for each quantifier, the following derivation [Id] (∀x)A(x) (∀x)A(x)
Similarly, the derivation for the existential quantifier
The second Cut step in the justification for the [∀L] rule was a t-Cut, a Cut on a term. This form of the Cut rule
is just as motivated as a Cut on sentences. (If there is a clash involved ruling t in and in ruling t out in a context, there is a clash in the underlying context.)
To complete the motivation of our logic with non-denoting terms we need to consider the interaction between denotation, predication and function terms, and to consider the behaviour of an 'existence predicate' which makes explicit in assertion and denial the term judgements involved in ruling in and ruling out terms. The latter is straightforward. Here is a defining rule for the existence predicate:
is syntactically a predicate, and it makes explicit the judgement that the term t denotes as a sentence. To rule 
t↓ t↓ [↓Df ] t t↓
The right rule replaces a term judgement t in the right hand side of a sequent with the corresponding sentence t↓, as expected.
For function terms, a natural constraint is that an n-place function f is defined on inputs t 1 , . . . , t n only when those inputs are defined. 11 This motivates the following interaction rule for term judgements and function application:
This seems very natural in the mathematical case ( 1 0 is not even, and neither is 1 0 prime), so we will adopt the rule here. Note that adopting such a rule involves drawing a distinction between primitive and complex predicates. While 1 0 is not even, the complex predicate 'not even' is truly applied to the term 1 0 . This rule, while satisfied by simple predicates F is not necessarily satisfied by other complex predicates-and of course, it cannot be satisfied by the negation of the definedness predicate ↓. That only truly applies to non-denoting terms by design. 12 11 So, on this view,
is undefined, even if the function λx.(x−x) is the constant zero function that is everywhere defined. To use the distinction from computer science, we adopt a call-by-value semantics rather than a call-by-name semantics for function evaluation [16] . Inputs to functions are evaluated before the evaluation of the function. 12 In a sequel to this paper, I will discuss this issue further, when examining generality and predicates. It is enough to leave that intersection in the highway of options for later, and to follow along with Feferman in this choice for free logic and predication.
With this motivation behind us, let's see where we have arrived, and examine this proof system in some detail.
derivations and systems
To be relatively precise, let's assume we work with a language consisting of a supply of names (m, n, n 1 , n 2 , . . .), and function symbols (f, g, etc.), and predicates (F, G, L, R, . . .). We include a special one-place predicate '↓', to be written postfix. A term in the language is either a name or a function symbol applied to an appropriate number of terms.
We also have an infinite supply of variables (x, y, z, x 1 , x 2 , . . .) to feature in our quantifiers. Formulas are combined with the usual connectives ∧, ∨, ⊃ and ¬. Sentences do not contain any free variables. To apply a quantifier (∃x) to a sentence A(n) with some number of instances of the name n designated, replace the name n by variable x and prefix the result with the quantifier.
We use the capital Greek letters Γ and ∆ variously for sets and multisets of sentences and terms. Two multisets are identical if they have the same members the same number of times, and two sets are identical if they merely have the same members. We write these multisets and sets in list notation without any parentheses since the only members are sentences or terms, and we use a comma to indicate adding a member to a set or multiset. (So, if t is a term and Γ is a multiset, then t, Γ is another multiset that contains everything to the same degree that Γ does, except for t, which it contains one more time than Γ does.)
In our sequent calculus, sequents are pairs of multisets, Γ ∆ consisting of sentences and terms. We call Γ the left hand side (lhs) of the sequent and ∆ its right hand side (rhs). The sequent calculus defines a class of derivations of sequents-trees of sequents constructed using the following rules. The leaves of derivations are Identity sequents of the following shapes:
These identity sequents incorporate the weakening rule. The presence of irrelevant extra formulas in the sequent is allowed.
The Identity rules are structural rules. A structural rule pays no heed to the internal structure of sentences or terms. Another structural rule is the rule of Contraction, which comes in four flavours: two left rules, and two right rules, two sentence rules and two term rules.
The contraction rules ensure that repeats of formulas or terms have no effect on the consequence relation. 13 Our next pair of structural rules are the Cut rules, again, one for a cut on a sentence and the other for a cut on a term.
Finally, we have the non-local rule of specification, which allows for the global replacement of a deductively general term n (a name) by a term t in the entire sequent.
Γ
That rounds out the structural rules of the calculus. To those we add the rules for function application and predication. These are not structural rules-they dictate the interaction between definedness of terms and function terms and predications, and so, they depend on the particular form of the sentences displayed in the rules.
Yet, these are not defining rules for any particular vocabulary. They are certainly not defining rules for the function terms or predicates, because they are the same shape rule for each predicate and function symbol of a given arity.
We have one defining rule for each logical concept in the vocabulary. Here are the defining rules for the propositional connectives:
And here are the defining rules for the quantifiers and the definedness predicate:
As usual, the quantifier rules have the usual side condition: the name n (a deductively general term) is not present in the conclusion of the rule. Let's call the system DL[Df, Cut, Spec] the proof system for definedness logic with Defining Rules, the Cut rules and the Specification Rule.
A derivation of a sequent Γ ∆ in DL[Df, Cut, Spec] is a tree of sequents, starting with Identity sequents at the leaves, each step of which is an instance of one of the of formulas do not. The difference is important for when we consider derivations as representing the structure of a proof. If a sequent A, B A ∧ B makes use of two premises, one used to justify the first conjunct of the conclusion, and the other to justify the second, then the proof would have still had that shape had A and B been the same formula. A proof step from A and A to A ∧ A is, in some sense, a different proof from a proof step from A to A ∧ A, even though they are equally valid.
Greg Restall, restall@unimelb.edu.au october 26, 2015 Version 0.963 rules, and which ends at the root in Γ ∆. Here is an example derivation in the proof system, of (∀x)A(x), t↓ A(t).
(∀x)A(x) (∀x)A(x)
[∀Df ]
(∀x)A(x), n A(n)
Here is a longer derivation, of the sequent (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Gx) (∃x)Fx ⊃ (∃x)Gx.
n, Gn (∃x)Gx
(In fact, this derivation is not formally correct as it is written. In order for the derivation to fit on the page, I have left out some irrelevant side formulas from instances of the Cut rule. Take the first s-Cut step, concluding in Fn ⊃ Gn, n, Fn (∃x)Gx. The Cut step is a cut on the formula Gn, so the two premises should be the sequents Fn ⊃ Gn, n, Fn Gn, (∃x)Gx and Fn ⊃ Gn, n, Fn, Gn (∃x)Gx. Instead, the left premise uses only the underlined formulas in Fn ⊃ Gn, n, Fn Gn, (∃x)Gx, leaving out the final formula (which is not used in the derivation of that sequent) and the second premise makes use only of Fn ⊃ Gn, n, Fn, Gn (∃x)Gx, leaving the rest aside. The full derivation, according to the formal definitions of the rules, would be much wider, and we have left out unused formulas for the sake of space.)
As we have seen in the first two sections of this paper, Specification can be eliminated as a rule if we are willing to generalise the Defining Rules, and the Defining Rules can be traded in for the traditional pairs of Left/Right rules of a sequent calculus. We will end this section precisely stating and proving these two facts. First, the elimination of Specification. The Generalised Defining Rules for the quantifiers are given as follows:
Γ, t, A(t) ∆
The ⇓ parts of these rules are one half of each of the original defining rules for the quantifiers, and they retain the side condition to the effect that the name n does not appear in the concluding sequent. The ⇑ parts of the rules are generalisations of the other halfs, allowing an implicit specification from the deductively general name n to the more specific term t. Let's call the system DL[GDf, Cut] the proof system for definedness logic with the Generalised Defining Rules, and the Cut rules but without the Specification Rule. t ] to convert the name in the conclusion of the Df step into the term required for the conclusion of the corresponding GDf step. The result is a derivation of our end sequent Γ ∆.
The process for replacing Defining Rules by Left and Right rules is also straightforward. As we have seen, the defining rules for the connectives, quantifiers and existence predicate can be replaced by the following Left/Right rules. The system DL[LR, Cut] consists of the structural rules of Identity, Contraction and Cut (so we leave out Specification), the predicate and function term rules, and these Left and Right rules for the connectives, quantifiers and definedness predicate. 
Γ t↓, ∆ 
Γ, A B, ∆ A(t), t A(t) t t, A(t)
[∀L] Each of these three proof systems makes use of Cut rules, both the traditional s-Cut for cuts on sentences, and the novel t-Cut for cuts on terms. In the next two sections we will move to show that DL[LR,Cut] is equivalent to DL [LR] , that any sequent derivable with the Cut rules is also derivable without them. To demonstrate this, we will more closely analyse those sequents which are not derivable in these proof systems, and explore the connection between underivable sequents and models [10] .
positions and refinement
If a sequent Γ ∆ cannot be derived, then, as far as the norms of our logic are concerned, there is no clash involved in asserting everything in Γ and denying something in ∆. If we think of the logic as informing and inscribing a field of play in which various assertions and denials are made and various terms are ruled in or ruled out, the underivable sequents Γ ∆ are different positions in that field of play.
To be precise, let us take a position (relative to a proof system) to be a pair [Γ : ∆] of sets Γ and ∆ where every Γ ′ ∆ ′ is underivable in that proof system, for any finite multisets Γ ′ and ∆ ′ where each element of Γ ′ is in Γ and every element of ∆ ′ is in ∆.
In this definition the components of a position differ from the lhs and rhs of a sequent in two ways. First, we do not care to keep track of the repetitions of sentences or terms in Γ and ∆, so we take them to be sets and not multisets. Furthermore, we allow Γ and ∆ to be infinite, while the lhs and rhs in a sequent in our proof systems are always finite. If [Γ : ∆] is a position, then there is no clash involved in selecting any assertions from Γ and any denials from ∆, however many we take. We will say that a position [Γ : ∆] is finite if and only if the sets Γ and ∆ are finite.
Our focus will be on positions in the system DL[LR], and our aim will be, in this section and the next, to show that those sequents which can not be derived without the use of the Cut rules could not have been derived with those rules, either. We will show this by way of a model construction, showing how DL[LR] positions may be "filled out" or "idealised" into models which serve as a witness (a model witnessing a position will evaluate each formula in its lhs as true, each term in its lhs as defined, each formula in its rhs as false, and each term in its rhs as undefined). These models will turn out to be models of the system DL[LR,Cut] too-it will be straightforward to show that these models only witnesses to positions in DL [LR,Cut] , so it will follow that DL [LR] positions are in fact DL[LR,Cut] positions, so any sequent derivable with Cuts is derivable without them. That is our target in this section and the next. 14 To start, let us focus on how positions may be progressively refined to make them more informative. In the same way we can define refinements for disjunctions, conditionals and negations occuring in the lhs or rhs of positions. The complete table of refinements for propositional connectives is given in Figure 1 .
Propositional refinement relations fill out our positions to carry more information concerning the components of sentences in positions. The same will hold for the definedness predicate and the quantifiers. A derivation that shows a refinement fails to be a position would show that the position of which it is a refinement were also not a position, contrary to hypothesis:
Similarly, we can define refinements for formulas featuring the quantifiers. Consider a position in which (∀x)A occurs in the lhs:
is a position, too, where t is any of the terms in the language. If these both failed to be a position, so would our starting position:
is a position too, where n is a name not present in
Dual reasoning applies to the existential quantifier rules. The table in Figure 2 presents refinements for quantifiers and the definedness predicate. We aim to find positions which are closed under these particular refinement relations, for these will be our guide to constructing a model. Consider refinement for conjunctions. If a conjunction is present in the lhs of such a position, so are its conjuncts. If a conjunction is in the rhs of such a position, so is one of its conjuncts (at least). Being on the lhs does a good job as a proxy for truth and being on the rhs does the same for falsity, at least as far as conjunction goes. For the definedness predicate, if the position places t↓ on the lhs, if it is closed under the definedness refinement conditions, t is also on the lhs. If t↓ is in the rhs, then so is t. So, if a term is on the lhs, according to that position, it is defined. If it is in the rhs, then according to that position it is undefined. For the quantifiers, if (∀x)A(x) is in the lhs of a position, and it is closed under quantifier refinement for each term in its own vocabulary, then for every such term t, either t is in the rhs (so, according to that position, t is undefined) or A(t) is in the lhs (so, A(t) is taken to be true). Similarly, if (∀x)A(x) is in the rhs of a position, then we have added a name n to the vocabulary of the position such that n occurs in the lhs and A(n) in the rhs. In other words, if the position takes (∀x)A(x) to be false, then we have equipped the vocabulary with some name n where according to the position n denotes, and A(n) is false.
In other words, positions closed under the refinement conditions do a good job of respecting natural truth conditions, at least for conjunction, definedness and the universal quantifier. But that is not quite enough for us to define models in which the entire logic is respected. For that, we need to consider the interaction between definedness, predication and function application. We would like to find positions which fully respect the conditions on predication and function application. If Ft 1 · · · t n is true, then each t i is defined . If f(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is defined, then each t i is defined. So, we will refine positions for predication and function application in the following way. If a position takes a predication to be true, we will add the terms of that predication to the lhs. If a position features a function position refinements f(t 1 , . . . , t n ), t 1 , . . . , t n : ∆] application in the lhs, we add the terms of that function application to the lhs too. The result in either case is a position, as the following derivations show, first for predication:
and then for function application:
This completes the definition of the refinement relations for the connectives, the quantifiers, the definedness predicate, and for primitive predication and function application. Now we will use this to construct a position closed under each of these relations in the appropriate fashion. 15 A set D of positions is said to be directed if it is (1) closed downward under refinement, in the sense that if 
are finite, there must be some n where
is a position too, and since Γ ′ and ∆ ′ were arbitrary finite subsets of ∪ ∞ i Γ i and
is indeed a position. So, the set of all finite positions refined by [
is a directed set, and these are exactly the positions refined by some position in the sequence.
In such a construction, we call the directed set D the wake of the sequence [Γ i : ∆ i ] of finite positions.
We will end this section with the characterisation of a construction of a special sequence of positions, with the target, in the limit, a fully refined position. (d) If it is a conjunction A ∧ B in the rhs, then either a position is formed by adding A or by adding B to the rhs. Choose whichever works, and add that formula to the rhs, assign it the next available number, mark A ∧ B as unavailable and repeat.
(e) If it is a disjunction A ∨ B in the lhs, then either a position is formed by adding A or by adding B to the lhs. Choose whichever works, and add that formula to the lhs, assign it the next available number, mark A ∨ B as unavailable and repeat.
(f) If it is a disjunction A ∨ B in the rhs, form the next position by adding A and B to the rhs, assign A and B the next available numbers, mark A ∨ B as unavailable and repeat.
(g) If it is a conditional A ⊃ B in the lhs, then either a position is formed by adding A to the rhs or by adding B to the lhs. Choose whichever works, and add that formula, assign it the next available number, mark A ⊃ B as unavailable and repeat.
(h) If it is a conditional A ⊃ B in the rhs, form the next position by adding A to the lhsand B to the rhs, assign A and B the next available numbers, mark A ⊃ B as unavailable and repeat.
(i) If is a definedness statement t↓ on either side, form the next position by adding the term t to the same side, assign this term the next available number, mark t↓ as unavailable, and repeat.
(j) If it is a universal quantifier (∀x)A(x) in the lhs, then do this for each term t in T -either adding A(t) to the lhs, or t to the rhs results in a position, so add whichever works, tagging the added formula or term with the next available number. Mark (∀x)A(x) as unavailable, but add it to the reserve list, to be processed whenever new terms are added to T .
(k) If it is a universal quantifier (∀x)A(x) in the rhs, then remove the first name from the list N of fresh names, add it to the set T of used terms, and form a new position by adding n to the lhs of the position and adding A(n) to the rhs, tagged with the next available number, and mark (∃x)A(x) as complete. Then revisit each formula on the reserve list as follows:
i. For each universal quantifier (∀x)B(x) in the lhs, add B(n) to the lhs, assigning it the next available number.
ii. For each existential quantifier (∃x)C(x) in the rhs, add C(n) to the rhs, assigning it the next available number.
(l) If it is an existential quantifier (∃x)A(x) in the lhs, then remove the first name from the list N of fresh names, add it to the set T of used terms, and form a new position by adding n and A(n) to the lhs, tagging A(n) with the next available number, and marking (∃x)A(x) as unavialable. Then revisit each formula on the reserve list as follows:
(m) If it is an existential quantifier (∃x)A(x) in the rhs, then do this for each term t in T -either adding A(t) to the rhs, or t to the rhs results in a position, so add whichever works, tagging the added formula or term with the next available number. Mark (∃x)A(x) as unavailable, but add it to the reserve list, to be processed whenever new terms are added to T .
(n) If it is a primitive predication Ft 1 · · · t n in the lhs, add t 1 , . . . , t n to the lhs, tagging each term with the next available numbers, and marking Ft 1 · · · t n as unavailable.
(o) If it is a function term f(t 1 , . . . , t n ) in the lhs, add t 1 , . . . , t n to the lhs, tagging each term with the next available numbers, and marking f(t 1 , . . . , t n ) as unavailable.
(p) If it is a primitive predication or a function term in the rhs, mark it as unavailable immediately, and repeat. 5 . End only when there is no formula available in the enumeration.
Proof: At each stage of the process, the result is another position, refining the previous positions. At each stage of the process, only finitely many formulas or terms are added, to construct the new position, so each formula or term added to a position along the way is assigned a finite number, except for fresh names added to the stock of defined terms-they get no numbers because they do not need to be processed. The process then considers each formula or term in the order of the number assigned, and ensures that we add the relevant formulas or terms in order to construct a position closed under the appropriate refinement condition. The result is a fully refining sequence of positions. The limit of such a sequence is a fully refined position which refines the starting position.
have n in Γ (and hence, n is defined in the model) and A(n) in ∆. By hypothesis, A(n) is false in the model, and hence, A(x) is false in the model when x is assigned the value n, so (∀x)A(x) is false in the model. The case for the existential quantifier is similar, and that ends the proof. This model constructed from the fully refined position is a model of that position.
completeness and cuts
The fact we have just proved gives us a completeness for the sequent calculus with respect to the models. We have shown that for any underivable sequent, there is a model (a model constructed out of a fully refined extension of that sequent) in which that sequent fails in the sense that it takes the lhs of the sequent to be true (defined) and the rhs to be false (undefined).
However, we have proved much more than the completeness of the sequent calculus. We On the other hand, it is straightforward to prove a soundness theorem. We can show that derivable sequents Γ ∆ hold in all models in the sense that in any model M if each element of Γ is true (for sentences) or defined (for terms) then some element of ∆ is true (for sentences) or defined (for terms). In fact, this holds for sequents derivable not only in DL [LR] , but also DL[LR, Cut].
Proof: A straightforward induction on the structure of the derivation. Identity axioms hold trivially: if A is true, it is true. If t is defined, it is defined. The structural rules-including Cuts-are straightforward. If Γ t, ∆ and Γ, t ∆ both hold in M then by Γ t, ∆ if each element of Γ is true then either an element of ∆ is true (in which case Γ ∆ holds in M) or t is defined in M. In that case, since Γ, t ∆ holds in M, in any case an element of ∆ is true, and so, Γ ∆ holds in M regardless. The case for sentence Cut has the same structure.
The connective, predication, function application, definedness and quantifier rules are satisfied trivially by way of the truth conditions for formulas, and the result is straightforward to prove.
It follows then, that we have the admissibility of Cut. 
consequences and questions
I will end with some brief observations and questions for further exploration.
First and foremost, this paper has explored defining rules as a new way to answer Prior's question concerning the difference between rules for logical constants familiar to us, like conjunction, and defective rules like Prior's rules for tonk. We have seen that this treatment of defining rules naturally extends to quantifiers, once we have not only the syntax of the predicate/term distinction, but also the notion of a deductively general term. This notion seems to be deeply embedded in proof-theoretical treatments of the quantifiers, and it seems well suited to the normative pragmatic intepretation of the sequent calculus in terms of norms governing assertion and denial.
If we allow for disagreement not only on what we take to be true or false, but also on what there is, then it seems very natural to extend the normative pragmatic treatment of assertion and denial to pro and con attitudes to terms, as well. The result is a relatively straightforward sequent calculus for a logic in which terms are free of existential import. This sequent calculus has pleasing theoretical properties, and natural Left and Right rules for the quantifiers can be understood as arising out of simple defining rules in a straightforward way. The fact that the results are so straightforward-using techniques known from elsewhere [10, 11] , with small changes to incorporate the behaviour of deductively general terms and the rule of Specification-lends some support to the thought that defining rules play a useful part in the design of a proof-theoretical framework.
We have seen that the rules for the quantifiers Γ, n A(n), ∆ = =========== = [∀Df ] Γ (∀x)A(x), ∆ Γ, n, A(n) ∆ = =========== = [∃Df ] Γ, (∃x)A(x) ∆ may be understood as defining those quantifiers. Given a language with deductively general terms n, we can add the quantifiers to that language by setting the denial of a universally quantified sentence (∀x)A(x) in a context [Γ : ∆] to be coherent if and only if it is coherent to both deny A(n) and take n to defined for some deductively general term n new to the context. Similarly, taking the assertion of an existentially quantified sentence (∃x)A(x) in a context [Γ : ∆] to be coherent if and only if it is coherent to assert A(n) and grant n to be defined for some deductively general term n new to that context. This suffices to add those quantifiers to the vocabulary in such a way as to validate all of the constraints of the definedness logic DL, without requiring that all singular terms be treated as referring.
The same can be said for the "definedness" or "existence" predicate ↓. This, too, is given by a straightforward defining rule:
where the assertion of t↓ is coherent if and only if taking t to be defined is coherent. Any practice in which we rule terms in as defined or out as undefined, provided that the structural rules of Identity, Weakening, Contraction and Cut (both sentence and term Cut) are satisfied, will allow for the extension of the practice to 'make explicit' the ruling in and out of terms in assertions and denials, by way of the predicate '↓.' In this sense, at least, those engaging in such a practice are treating the existence predicate as a logical concept, as rigorously and precisely defined as the concepts of conjunction, negation or the quantifiers.
Questions remain. In following papers I will address questions concerning modality and identity. Both are very important if the issue of the semantics of quantifiers and the behaviour of non-denoting terms is to be thoroughly understood. We have focussed here on one motivation for non-denoting terms: from mathematics. The behaviour of contingently non-denoting terms seems to be very different, but these techniques seem like they may be appropriate there, too. But are they? The proof of this will be in the detail, and there is more detail than could reasonably fit in this paper, so I will follow that thread in the sequel to this paper.
Before that sequel, however, I will end with a question which raises concerns for the significance of the choice of the free logic for quantifiers, and of the kind of criterion for meaningfulness that may be provided by defining rules in a logical system. Suppose we take our definedness logic DL seriously. Consider the following defining rules for concepts that certainly look like quantifiers: 
